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ARTICLES

CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES 2001:
AN OVERVIEW
Patrick J. Monahan*

This book, which consists of the papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law
School’s 5th Annual Constitutional Cases Conference held on April 12, 2002,
examines the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released
in the calendar year 2001.1 The Court handed down a total of 91 decisions in
2001, including 19 constitutional decisions.2 This represents the largest number
of total judgments released by the Supreme Court since 1998, and a significant
increase from the 72 decisions released in calendar year 2000. It is difficult to
identify the reason for the increased output in 2001, but one factor may have
been the fact that for the first time in a number of years, the Court was at full
strength and had a stable membership.

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School.
1
A case is considered to be a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the
interpretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada,” as defined in s. 52 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
The 19 constitutional decisions in calendar year 2001 were as follows: Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2001), 207 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.); Law Society (British Columbia)
v. Mangat (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.); Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R 911;
O.E.C.T.A. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 470; R. v. Advance Cutting and
Coring Ltd. (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.); R. v. Dutra, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 759; R. v.
Golden, (2001), 207 D.L.R. (4th) 18 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hynes (2001), 206 D.L.R. (4th) 483
(S.C.C.); R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3; Ontario v. 974649 Ontario Inc. (2001), 200 D.L.R.
(4th) 444 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 344; R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R.
687; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45; Smith v. Canada, 2001 S.C.C. 88; Therrien (Re), [2001] 2
S.C.R 3; United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; United States v. Cobb, [2001] 1 S.C.R.
587; United States v. Tsioubris, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 613; United States v. Kwok, [2001] 1 S.C.R.
532; United States v. Shulman, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 616. Note that the facts and judgment in Cobb
and Tsioubris were identical, and so these decisions are treated as a single case.
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The Court was unanimous in 82 percent of its judgments released in 2001,
including in 79 percent (15/19) of the constitutional cases. 3 This rather remarkable degree of unanimity is the highest in the past 15 years, and confirms the
fact that Canada’s highest court manifests a much higher degree of consensus
than its American counterpart (which is unanimous in approximately 40-45
percent of its appeal judgments). Despite the tendency of commentators to
focus on differences amongst members of the Court, in this past year in particular the Court was in broad agreement on the vast majority of matters it decided.
The Court also dealt with 668 leave applications in 2001, which is a record.
Almost 200 leave applications were filed from the province of Quebec alone, as
compared to just 130 Quebec leave applications in 2000. The number of leave
applications from Ontario and the Federal Court of Appeal declined slightly in
2001, while the leave applications from the other provinces remained constant. 4

I. CHARTER CASES
Of the 19 constitutional cases in 2001, 16 were Charter cases. The Charter
claimant was successful in 8 of these 16 cases in 2001 which, as Table 1 below
indicates, equals the highest success rate for Charter claims in the past decade. 5
However, despite fluctuations in the individual yearly outcomes, overall the
success rate for Charter claims over the past decade has remained relatively
constant, with approximately one out of every three Charter claims being determined by the Supreme Court of Canada in favour of the claimant. This established equilibrium in the outcomes of Charter cases reflects the fact that, with the
Court now able to largely control its own docket through the process of granting leave to appeal, it is able to ensure that it only hears cases with a reasonable
prospect of success.

3

A decision is considered to be unanimous when all members of the Court concur in the result, even if different reasons are written in support of that result.
4
Statistics on leave applications are available from the Court at <www.scc-csc.gc.ca> under
the link “Information on Cases”.
5
A Charter claim is treated as being successful when the claimant receives some form of relief under s. 24 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, or where a statute or other
legal rule is declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
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Table 1
Success Rate of Charter Claimants
At the Supreme Court of Canada 1991-2001
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
TOTAL

Charter
Challenges
35
38
42
26
33
35
20
21
14
11
16
291

Claimant
Succeeds
15
12
9
11
8
8
10
8
5
3
8
97

Success Rate
43%
32%
21%
42%
24%
23%
50%
38%
36%
27%
50%
33%

A number of the Court’s 2001 Charter decisions received widespread media
attention, particularly the R. v. Sharpe decision on child pornography in January and the United States v. Burns decision on extradition in February. However, as the paper in this volume by Osgoode Hall Law School Professor Jamie
Cameron argues, two of the most significant 2001 Charter decisions from a
public policy and jurisprudential perspective were the freedom of association
cases released near the end of the year, Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General)
and R. v. Advance Cutting and Coring Ltd.
1. Fundamental Freedoms and Equality
In one sense, the contrast between Dunmore and Advance Cutting and Coring is striking. In Dunmore, the Court ruled that Ontario statutory provisions
which excluded agricultural workers from a provincial labour relations regime
were unconstitutional, whereas in Advance Cutting and Coring the Supreme
Court deferred to the Quebec National Assembly and upheld statutory provisions which required workers in the construction industry in that province to
become a member in one of five government-recognized employee associations. The decision in Dunmore can properly be charactered as an activist one
since, as Justice Robert Sharpe (as he then was) had ruled in a lengthy and
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reasoned judgment at first instance, the exclusion of agricultural workers from
the provincial labour relations regime did not prevent such workers from forming an association.6 The complaint of the applicants in Dunmore was that they
were being denied certain statutory protections that they regarded as essential in
order to form a trade union.7 However, as Sharpe J. pointed out (and as the
Ontario Court of Appeal had unanimously agreed), 8 these complaints seemed to
be directed at the private actions of employers rather than the legislative regime
itself. The Supreme Court of Canada had decided in Dolphin Delivery9 that the
Charter did not apply to private action, which seemed to suggest that the freedom of association claim must necessarily fail on the basis that the limits on the
applicants’ freedom of association did not arise from government action.
The Supreme Court decided otherwise, by an 8-1 margin. The majority
judgment of Bastarache J. concluded that the exclusion of agricultural workers
from the provincial labour relations scheme had the effect of substantially
interfering with their right to organize collectively. The Supreme Court agreed
with the applicants’ argument that, without the protection of the labour relations regime, agricultural workers had no realistic chance of associating. But
what of Sharpe J.’s point that this denial of the right to associate was attributable to the private actions of employers rather than of the government or the
legislature, and thus was not subject to the Charter? While the Supreme Court’s
reasoning on this point is not entirely clear, Bastarache J. seems to argue that
the claim is susceptible to Charter review because it is based on both section
2(d) and section 15 of the Charter.
Bastarache J. emphasizes in his reasons that the complaint of the applicants
is that the legislation is “underinclusive,” in the sense that it denies to agricultural workers a benefit or right that is accorded to others. Bastarache J. acknowledges that where a group makes a claim that legislation is underinclusive,
the normal course is to review such underinclusiveness under section 15(1)
rather than section 2(d). But, according to Bastarache J., where this underinclusiveness results in the violation of freedom of association, that violation may be
subject to Charter review on the basis of section 2(d) even where the limitations

6

See Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1997), 155 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.), at 206-

207.
7
For example, the applicants objected to the fact that agricultural employers were able to
deny union organizers access to private property to meet with workers to persuade them to join a
union, as well as to the fact that agricultural workers who attempted to form a trade union might be
subject to economic reprisals from their employers.
8
In a short judgment, Krever J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal, concurred in by Doherty
and Rosenberg JJ.A., had agreed with the reasons of Sharpe J. See Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney
General) (1999), 182 D.L.R. (4th) 471 (C.A.).
9
R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
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on freedom of association arise from the actions of private employers rather
than the government. How this should be so, given the fact that section 32
limits the Charter to the actions of the government or legislature, is never
clearly explained by Bastarache J., although he does comment at one point that
the “message” of the legislation is to implicitly encourage employers to thwart
the organizing efforts of their agricultural workers. But Bastarache J. did not
point to any evidence establishing a causal connection between the enactment
of the impugned legislation and actions taken by employers. In any event,
assuming such a causal connection could be established or assumed to exist,
then surely this in itself would have been sufficient to engage the application of
the Charter, without having to resort to a novel theory about the application of
section 2(d) to the actions of private employers in circumstances where legislation could be said to be underinclusive.
It is unclear as to how far this novel argument extending the application to
the Charter in cases of underinclusive legislation will apply in future cases.
Bastarache J. repeatedly emphasizes the “exceptional” character of the claim in
this particular case, which leaves the Supreme Court ample room to back away
from or modify this new line of argument in future cases. 10 A much more direct
and straightforward approach would have been simply to analyze the claim
under section 15, since there is no doubt that underinclusive legislation is subject to review under section 15. Yet the Court may have felt itself unable to
pursue this obvious and direct route because of the highly complicated and
unsatisfactory character of the Court’s equality rights jurisprudence under
section 15. In fact, as Sonia Lawrence points out in her commentary on section
15(1) jurisprudence at the Supreme Court of Canada this past year, the Court’s
section 15 test as set forth in the 1999 decision in Law v. Canada11 is increasingly seen as problematic. In particular, the requirement that legislation be
found to demean “human dignity” before a section 15 violation can be established is not only highly subjective, but it seems to narrow unduly the scope of
the equality guarantee.12 In fact, as Lawrence points out in her commentary, the
Court’s divided decision in Lavoie v. Canada (Public Service Commission),

10

For example, in para. 22 Bastarache J. states that legislation that is underinclusive may “in
unique contexts, substantially impact the exercise of a constitutional freedom” (emphasis added); in
para. 28, Bastarache J. notes that such claims will not be common, while in para. 30, he describes
such claims as “rare” [Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General, supra, note 2].
11
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.
12
A much more straightforward approach would be to declare that legislation that imposes
differential treatment on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground is presumptively contrary
to s. 15, and must be justified under s. 1. For an analysis along these lines, see the judgment of
McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
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released in early 2002,13 is the first indication that some members of the Court
may be sufficiently unhappy with the Law test such that they may be prepared
to revisit it in the future.
If Dunmore took a broad view of the associational claim in that particular
case, the decision in Advance Cutting and Coring indicated that the Court is
still seriously divided as to the overall meaning of the guarantee of freedom of
association in section 2(d). At issue in Advance Cutting and Coring was Quebec legislation which required workers in the construction industry in Quebec
to join one of five government-recognized trade unions. While the Court ultimately upheld the legislation on the basis that the legislation’s infringement of
section 2(d) could be upheld as a reasonable limit under section 1, there were
four separate opinions written, and none of them commanded the support of a
majority of the Court.
The Court did affirm, by an 8-1 margin, the principle that section 2(d) includes a negative right not to associate, in addition to a positive right to associate.14 However, the eight members of the Court who accepted this proposition
did so for three separate sets of reasons, written by LeBel J. (for himself,
Gonthier and Arbour JJ.), Bastarache J. (for himself, McLachlin C.J., Major
and Binnie JJ.) and Iacobucci J. on his own behalf. Moreover, each of the three
opinions on this point adopted a different formulation of the circumstances in
which a negative right not to associate will be engaged by legislation or government action. The opinion of Bastarache J., which was supported by four
members of the Court, seemed to suggest that a requirement to join a trade
union was necessarily a form of ideological coercion that violated section 2(d),
given the nature of trade unions as participatory bodies holding political and
economic roles in society. In contrast, LeBel J., whose opinion was supported
by a total of three members of the Court, argued that a requirement to join a
trade union violated section 2(d) only where there was evidence that the particular unions involved had ideologically coerced their members. Since there
was no such evidence in the record, in LeBel J.’s view the freedom of association claim failed. Finally, Iacobucci J. argued in his opinion that where the state
obliges an association of individuals whose affiliation is already compelled by
the “facts of life” (such as through a common workplace), there is no violation
of freedom of association, provided that the compelled association “furthers the
common good.” However, in Iacobucci J.’s view the compelled trade union
membership in this case was not shown to further the common good, since

13

[2002] SCC 23.
Only L’Heureux-Dubé J. dissented on this point, with the judgments of LeBel, Bastarache
and Iacobucci JJ. for the other eight members of the Court affirming this principle, which had
previously been recognized in Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211.
14
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union membership was not linked to any competency requirement and there
was a clear violation of workers’ liberty interests. In the result, the Court ruled
by a narrow 5-4 majority that the compelled membership in a trade union in
this particular case violated section 2(d), with the majority consisting of Bastarache J. (and three others) and Iacobucci J.
On section 1, Bastarache J. would have found the legislation to be an unjustified infringement of freedom of association and would have ruled the relevant
statutory provisions to be invalid.15 But Iacobucci J. parted company with
Bastarache J. on the section 1 issue, with Iacobucci J. agreeing with LeBel J.
that the legislation was adopted “within a unique and complex historical context
. . . to promote distinct social and economic objectives that were, and remain,
pressing and substantial.”16 The Court was thus evenly divided 4-4 on whether
the legislation could be upheld as a reasonable limit under section 1. 17 Since
L’Heureux-Dubé J. had found that there was no violation of section 2(d) in the
first place (on the basis that section 2(d) did not include a right not to associate), in the result the legislation was upheld as valid.
While the reasoning in Advance Cutting and Coring failed to clarify the
scope of section 2(d), it did reflect the Supreme Court’s continuing caution with
respect to cases originating from the province of Quebec. As Table 2 below
indicates, over the past five years, the Court has ruled Quebec legislation or
government action to be unconstitutional on two occasions, Reference re Secession of Quebec18 and Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General).19 Yet in both instances, the Court’s opinion was carefully circumscribed and tailored so as to
avoid any appearance of thwarting the prerogatives or jurisdiction of the Quebec government or National Assembly. In Libman, for example, the Court
struck down a provision which prohibited spending by independent third parties
in a provincial referendum campaign. At the same time the Court went out of
its way to indicate that substitute legislation permitting very modest third party
expenditures would likely be constitutionally valid, and the Quebec National
Assembly followed up this suggestion by enacting such legislation. In Reference re Secession of Quebec the Court did rule that Quebec’s unilateral secession from Canada was not authorized by the Canadian Constitution, but it also
declared that a clear majority vote on a clear referendum question on secession
15
Bastarache J. would have suspended the declaration of invalidity for a period of 18 months
to permit the government to consider amendments to its legislation. See Advance Cutting and
Coring, supra, note 2, at para. 52.
16
Ibid., at para. 290.
17
The ninth member of the Court, L’Heureux-Dubé J., did not find it necessary to deal with
s. 1 since in her view there was no violation of s. 2(d).
18
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
19
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 569.
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would give rise to a constitutional duty on the Canadian government and the
governments of the other provinces to negotiate the terms of secession in good
faith. This argument was not raised by the amicus curiae and appeared to have
been developed by the Court e propio motu.20

20
See Monahan, “The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession
Reference” (1999), 11 N.J.C.L. 65.
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TABLE 2
Supreme Court Decisions Declaring Statutes or
Regulations Unconstitutional, 1997-200121
2001
Dunmore v. Ontario
(Attorney General) (2001), 207
D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.).
Law Society (British Columbia) v. Mangat (2001), 205
D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R.
687.

R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R.
45.
2000
Little Sisters Book & Art
Emporium v. Canada (Minister
of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R.
1120.
1999
R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1
S.C.R. 393.
Westbank First Nation v.
British Columbia Hydro &
Power Authority, [1999] 3
S.C.R. 134.
Corbiere v. Canada (Minister
of Indian & Northern
Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203.
M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.
M & D Farm Ltd. v. Manitoba Agricultural Credit
Corp., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 961.

Constitutional
Provision
Charter, s. 2(d)

Federalism,
paramountcy

Charter, s. 7

Charter, s. 2(b)

Result
Exclusion of agricultural workers from
Ontario Labour Relations Act violates s.
2(d).
Provincial Legal Profession Act inoperative
as it applies to non-lawyers acting before
the Immigration and Refugee Board due to
conflict with paramount federal legislation
Statutory defence of duress, as described by
s. 17 of the Criminal Code, held to violate
s. 7 for failure to allow for persons not
acting with moral voluntariness.
Exceptions read into s. 163.1(4) of Criminal
Code to save provision under s. 1.

Charter, s. 2(b)

Section 152(3) of Customs Act, placing the
onus on an importer of expressive material
to justify importation, violates s. 2(b) of the
Charter.

Aboriginal, s. 35,
Constitution Act,
1930
Federalism, s. 125,
Constitution Act,
1867 [“C.A.
1867”]
Charter, s. 15

Provincial Park regulations (Saskatchewan)
inapplicable due to conflict with treaty
rights.
Indian Band taxation by-laws inapplicable
to provincial utility due to s. 125 of C.A.
1867.

Charter, s. 15
Federalism,
paramountcy

U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v.
KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] 2
S.C.R. 1083.

Charter, s. 2(b)

1999 (cont’d)

Constitutional
Provision

Exclusion of off-reserve band members
from voting privileges by s. 77(1) Indian
Act violates s. 15 of Charter.
Definition of spouse in Ontario Family Law
Act violates 15(1).
Provincial Court order obtained pursuant to
Family Farm Protection Act (Manitoba)
invalid due to conflict with paramount
federal legislation.
Overbroad definition of picketing in Industrial Relations Act of New Brunswick
violates s. 2(b).
Result

12

R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3
S.C.R. 456. 21
1998
Eurig Estate (Re), [1998] 2
S.C.R. 565.
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1
S.C.R. 493.
Thomson Newspapers v.
Canada (Attorney General),
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 877.
R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R.
439.
1997
Godbout v. Longueuil (City),
[1997] 3 S.C.R 844.

Supreme Court Law Review

Aboriginal, s. 35

Federal fisheries regulations interfere with
treaty right to fish, not applicable to the
accused.

Federalism, s. 53,
C.A. 1867

Regulation under the Ontario Administration of Justice Act providing for probate
fees ruled unconstitutional
Provincial human rights code unconstitutional for failing to prohibit discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.
Provision in Canada Election Act prohibiting publication of polls for 72 hours prior to
election date ruled invalid.
Part of defamatory libel provision in
Criminal Code ruled unconstitutional as an
unjustified limit on free expression.

Charter, s. 15

Charter, s. 2(b)

Charter, s. 2(b)

Charter, s. 7

Reference Re Remuneration
of Judges of the Provincial
Court of Prince Edward
Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.

Charter, s. 11
and Federalism
(preamble)

Libman v. Quebec (Attorney
General), [1997] 3 S.C.R.
569.
Benner v. Canada (Secretary
of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R.
358.

Charter, s. 2(b)

Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R.
1010.

(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Charter, s. 15

Aboriginal, s. 35

Residency requirement by municipality of
Longueuil ruled an unconstitutional infringement of liberty under s. 7.
Legislation reducing salaries of provincial
court judges in three provinces ruled
unconstitutional as infringing judicial
independence; provinces required to set up
independent commissions to make recommendations as to provincial court salaries.
Spending limits in Quebec referendum
legislation ruled unconstitutional limit on
freedom of expression.
Provision in federal Citizenship Act requiring children born abroad of a Canadian
mother prior to 1977 to undergo a security
check ruled unconstitutional as a violation
of equality rights.
B.C. legislation cannot extinguish Aboriginal title in B.C.

21
Cases in bold denote federal statutes or regulations. Table includes all constitutional cases
(including Charter, federalism and Aboriginal).
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In Advance Cutting and Coring, the opinions of LeBel J. and Iacobucci J. reflected extreme caution on the part of the Court in reviewing a deliberate and
relatively recent policy choice of the Quebec National Assembly. Both opinions
emphasized the fact that the legislation at issue reflected complex and difficult
trade-offs that had been made by the Quebec National Assembly, and that this
policy determination was therefore entitled to substantial judicial deference.
LeBel J. in particular also argued that federalism considerations militated in
favour of the validity of the legislation, since the scheme was a product of the
particular historical experience of Quebec’s labour relations regime and “this
Court’s approach to . . . federalism accepts the legislative solutions specific to
each province.”22 Thus an important ingredient leading to the result in Advance
Cutting must surely have been the Court’s reluctance to tamper with an important social and political compromise that seemed to have worked tolerably well
in the province of Quebec for an extended period of time.
2. Other Charter Cases
There were two other Charter cases in 2001 in which statutory provisions
were ruled unconstitutional, but neither had the impact or significance of Dunmore. In the high-profile case of Sharpe, the Court ruled that the existing
Criminal Code23 provisions prohibiting the possession of child pornography
were overly broad, but the Court then went on to “read in” a number of narrow
exceptions to the legislation in order to render it valid. At a subsequent trial
held in early 2002, Sharpe was convicted of possession of child pornography on
the basis of the Criminal Code provisions as amended by the Court. 24 The other
2001 case which struck down a statutory provision was Ruzic, where the Supreme Court ruled that section 17 of the Criminal Code, which defined the
defence of duress, violated section 7 and could not be justified under section 1.
But this merely had the effect of substituting the common law defence, which
was only slightly broader than the statutory version of the defence. 25

22

Advance Cutting and Coring, supra, note 2, at para. 276.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
24
See R. v. Sharpe, [2002] B.C.J. No. 610 (S.C.), online: QL (BCJ).
25
Section 17 of the Criminal Code [am. R.S.C. 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 40(2) (Sch. I, item
1)] was found to be unconstitutional in that it only permitted an accused to invoke the defence of
duress when compelled to commit an offence under threats of immediate bodily harm from a
person who was present when the offence was committed. The Court found that this was a violation
of s. 7 of the Charter, since it would permit the conviction of a person who committed an offence
because of threats of death or serious bodily harm, if the individual making the threats was not
present at the scene of the crime, or if the threats of harm were not immediate. The common law
defence, which did not have these criteria of immediacy and presence, was found not to have been
23
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Challenges to government decisions or actions (as opposed to statutes or
regulations) succeeded in five Charter cases in 2001, including Burns, in which
the Court found that the Minister of Justice’s decision to extradite an accused to
the United States without seeking assurances that the death penalty would not
be imposed violated section 7 of the Charter. 26 While highly symbolic, the
impact of Burns will likely be limited to the extradition context. The Court’s
analysis of the meaning of the “principles of fundamental justice” under section
7 in Burns does not appear to have broken any new ground, and was very much
focussed on the concerns that have arisen in recent years over the appropriateness of the death penalty. While there are certain statements in the case suggesting that any attempt to re-institute the death penalty in Canada might well
violate the Charter, there seems little practical likelihood of any such initiative
being advanced by the Canadian government in the foreseeable future. Indeed,
as the Court itself emphasized in its reasons, the dominant international trend is
towards abolition, rather than retention or expansion of the use of the death
penalty.

II. ABORIGINAL CASES IN 2001
In Mitchell v. M.N.R., the only Supreme Court Aboriginal rights case of
2001, the Court found that Mohawk Canadians of Akwesasne did not have a
constitutionally protected Aboriginal right to bring goods across the CanadaU.S. border free of customs duty. As the two commentaries on the case included in this volume explain,27 Mitchell is significant for a number of reasons.
First, while Mitchell himself had defined the Aboriginal right in question as the
right to bring three categories of goods across the border for limited trade with
certain Aboriginal partners, the Supreme Court rejected this characterization
and held, instead, that the right at issue was simply the right to bring goods
across the border “for purposes of trade.” 28 The majority judgment of McLachsuperseded by the statutory defence and was accordingly substituted by the Court for the invalid s.
17.
26
See the commentaries by Martin, “Extradition, the Charter and Due Process” and by Young,
“Fundamental Justice and Political Power,” included in this volume. In addition to Burns, challenges
to government action succeeded in the following: Golden (holding that a strip search performed at a
restaurant was unreasonable); 974649 Ontario Inc. (holding that a justice of the peace has the power to
order costs against the Crown); and Cobb, Tsioubris, Kwok and Shulman, all of which held that
extradition proceedings should be stayed due to the improper conduct of U.S. government officials.
27
See Hutchins and Choksi, “From Calder to Mitchell” and Christie, “The Court’s Exercise
of Plenary Power.”
28
See the judgment of McLachlin C.J., concurred in by Gonthier, Iacobucci, Arbour and LeBel
JJ. [Mitchell v. M.N.R., supra, note 2]. Binnie J. wrote a separate concurring opinion (concurred in by
Major J.) which agreed with the reasons of the Chief Justice and added separate reasons of his own.
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lin C.J. argued that the right should be characterized in this manner due to the
nature of the ancestral practice relied on as well as the governmental legislation
with which it conflicted. But perhaps the most telling point was the practical
one. If Chief Mitchell was allowed to bring goods across the border, for specific or limited purposes without the payment of duty, there would be no means
of enforcing these limitations; once the goods were across the border they could
be traded with anyone for any purpose. Thus the proposed limitations on the
scope of the Aboriginal right to transport goods across the border would in practice prove illusory, which was a key consideration that led the Court to characterize the right more broadly as simply the right to transport goods across the border
for trade.29
Mitchell is also significant for the comments of the Court on the admissibility and use of evidence in Aboriginal cases, particularly oral histories. The
Court in Delgamuukw30 had held that oral histories of Aboriginal peoples were
admissible and had to be given appropriate weight in the fact-finding process.
But
in
Mitchell
the
Court placed some important qualifiers on the use of oral histories. First, the
Court stated that oral histories are not automatically admissible, but have to
satisfy tests of usefulness and reasonable reliability.31 Second, even where
admissible, the reliance on oral histories must not negate the operation of “general evidentiary principles,” with the Court noting that “[t]here is a boundary
that must not be crossed between a sensitive application and a complete abandonment of the rules of evidence.”32 According to the Court, claims of Aboriginal rights must be supported by “cogent evidence establishing their validity on
a balance of probabilities,” and “[s]parse, doubtful and equivocal evidence
cannot serve as the foundation for a successful claim.”33 The Court went on to
conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial judge’s finding

Thus the reasons of the Chief Justice appear to have enjoyed the support of all seven members of the
Court who participated in the appeal.
29
Ibid., at para. 20. This concern over the practical consequences of recognition of an Aboriginal right has not always been addressed directly by the Supreme Court. The discussion of these
practical concerns in Mitchell may well be a reflection of the experience of the Court following the
decision in R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (“Marshall No. 1”), in which the recognition of an
Aboriginal right to fish for eels led to a wide variety of claims by Aboriginal peoples to exploit
natural resources in Atlantic Canada. The Court subsequently issued a clarification of its views in
R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 [“Marshall No. 2”], in which it was pointed out that the initial
decision could not necessarily be applied in these rather different contexts.
30
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
31
Mitchell v. M.N.R., supra, note 2, at para. 33.
32
Ibid., at paras. 38, 39.
33
Ibid., at para. 51.
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that the Mohawks had an ancestral practice of transporting goods across the St.
Lawrence River for the purposes of trade. While findings of fact are entitled to
deference from an appellate court, the trial judge’s findings in this case represented a “palpable and overriding error” warranting the substitution of a different result.
The Supreme Court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence to establish
an Aboriginal right to transport goods across the Canada-U.S. border for purposes of trade was sufficient in itself to dispose of the appeal. But two members
of the Court, Binnie and Major JJ., went on to consider and to accept an alternative argument advanced by the Crown which would have precluded recognition of the right claimed in any event.34 This argument was that the doctrine of
“sovereign incompatibility” continued to exist in Canadian constitutional law
despite the enactment of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,35 and that
the application of this doctrine precluded the recognition of a right to enter
Canada free of a requirement to pay duty. While acknowledging that the doctrine of sovereign incompatibility had in the past been applied in an overly
expansive manner by the Courts, with the result that Aboriginal rights were
unduly narrowed or deemed to have been extinguished, Binnie J. affirmed that
the doctrine remains an element of the Canadian constitutional order. Binnie J.
went on to conclude that an essential attribute of state sovereignty is the right to
control who will enter the state’s territory. Since the Aboriginal right claimed in
this case was inconsistent with this key aspect of Canadian sovereignty, the
right in question must be held to have been extinguished by the assertion of
British sovereignty in North America. The acceptance of this argument, even if
only by two members of the Court, must be counted as a major new development in Aboriginal rights jurisprudence; the existing test for the recognition and
application of Aboriginal rights, as stated in Van der Peet,36 makes no reference
whatever to the doctrine of sovereign incompatibility as a means whereby
Aboriginal rights can be extinguished.37
In general terms, what is most striking about all of these various doctrinal
developments in Mitchell is the evident desire on the part of the Court to narrow or limit certain aspects of the more expansive doctrines favouring Aborigi34

The judgment of McLachlin C.J. expressly refused to comment on the argument relating
to “sovereign incompatibility” that was discussed and accepted by Binnie J. See ibid., at para. 64.
35
The doctrine of sovereign incompatibility involves the claim that the assertion of sovereignty by the European powers in North America was necessarily incompatible with the survival
and
continuation
of
Aboriginal
rights.
See
the
judgment
of
Binnie J., ibid., at para. 67.
36
See R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507.
37
See Slattery, “Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (2000), 79 Can. Bar Rev.
196.
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nal rights put forward in cases such as Delgamuukw and Marshall No. 1.38
What Mitchell indicates is that the recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal
rights under section 35(1) must not be construed in such a way that compromises the practical and effective enforcement of Canadian laws. This carries
forward and reinforces the tendency reflected in the Court’s opinion in Marshall No. 2,39 where the Court had sought to limit the scope and potential application of the principles announced in Marshall No. 1. Of course, Mitchell was
released prior to the events of September 11, 2001, and the events of that day
can be expected to reinforce the sentiments expressed by the Court in Mitchell.

III. FEDERALISM DOCTRINE AT THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA
There were three federalism cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada
in 2001: Mangat (ruling that the federal Immigration Act40 is inconsistent with
and paramount over B.C.’s Legal Profession Act),41 Therrien (Re) (upholding
provisions in Quebec’s Courts of Justice Act42 permitting the removal of judges
of the Court of Quebec);43 and the O.E.C.T.A. case (upholding a new scheme
for school funding in Ontario).44 The federalism docket in 2001 reflects the
tendency of the recent past, in which constitutional litigation has increasingly
focussed on Charter and Aboriginal issues, as opposed to federalism concerns.
Indeed, as Table 3 below indicates, over the past five years, there has been a
total of just 15 federalism cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada.
These numbers are reminiscent of the 1950s and 1960s and are a far cry from
the early 1980s, the high-water mark of federalism litigation at the Supreme
Court of Canada in the past 50 years, when the Court was deciding an average
of over 11 federalism cases annually.
TABLE 3
Federalism Cases at the SCC 1950-200145
TIME PERIOD

38
39
40
41
42
43
44

FEDERALISM
CASES

TOTAL
CASES

AVERAGE

See supra, note 29.
Ibid.
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 255.
R.S.Q. c. T-16.
See the commentary by Sharpe included in this volume on this case.
See the commentary by Hogg included in this volume on this case.
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1950-59

30

651

3/year — 4.6% of total

1960-69
1970-79

36
54

1161
1464

3.6/year — 3.1% of total
5.4/year — 3.7% of total

1980-84
1997-2001

57
15

524
43845

11.4/year — 10.9% of total
3/year — 3.4% of total

The success of the federal government in federalism litigation at the Supreme Court of Canada in the recent past is also noteworthy. There have been
only two federal statutes whose validity has been challenged on federalism
grounds before the Supreme Court of Canada over the past five years, and in
both instances the federal statute was upheld as valid.46 In contrast, a total of ten
provincial statutes or government actions were challenged before the Supreme
Court of Canada over the past five years, and the challenge was successful on
four occasions.47 Two of those cases involved paramountcy arguments, in
which the Court found that provincial legislation was inoperative due to conflict with paramount federal legislation;48 this confirms a newfound willingness
on the part of the Court to invoke paramountcy considerations as a basis for

45

The 15 federalism decisions (i.e., cases in which a provision of the Constitution Act, 1867
[(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5] was the basis of the decision)
released by the Court from January 1, 1997 until December 31, 2001 are as follows: Germain v.
Montreal (City), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1144; Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board) [1997] 2
S.C.R. 581; R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213; Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (National
Energy Board), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; Eurig
Estate (Re), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565; Consortium Developments (Clearwater) Ltd. v. Sarnia (City),
[1998] 3 S.C.R. 3; M & D Farm Ltd. v. Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corp., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 961;
Westbank First Nation v. British Columbia Hydro & Power Authority, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 134; Global
Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494; Reference re
Firearms Act (Canada), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783; Public School Boards’ Assn. (Alberta) v. Alberta
(Attorney General), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 409; O.E.C.T.A. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 1
S.C.R. 470; Therrien (Re), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 3; Law Society (British Columbia) v. Mangat (2001),
205 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.).
46
See R. v. Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (upholding provisions of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 16) and Reference re Firearms Act, [2000]
1 S.C.R. 783 (upholding the Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39). A third case involving federal jurisdiction, Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322, upheld
the jurisdiction of the National Energy Board over a gas pipeline undertaking but did not involve
the validity of a statutory provision.
47
See Eurig Estate (Re), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565; Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra, note
18; M & D Farm Ltd. v. Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corp., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 961; and Mangat,
supra, note 2.
48
In addition to Mangat, ibid., a paramountcy argument succeeded in M & D Farm Ltd.,
ibid.
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limiting the operation of provincial laws. 49 In these instances, however, the
Court is merely giving effect to statutes enacted by Parliament, as opposed to
attempting to limit provincial jurisdiction on the basis of the Court’s own interpretation of the open-ended categories in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution
Act, 1867. In general terms, it is evident that federalism litigation is today much
less significant, both in terms of the numbers of cases as well as their practical
impact, than was the case 20 years ago.

IV. CONCLUSION
In addition to tracking and analyzing the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence in 2001, the papers in this volume also consider a number of
broader issues and developments that have occupied both the Supreme Court
and Canadian governments in recent years. The paper by Supreme Court Justice Louis LeBel considers the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on international law and international legal principles in the development of Canadian
domestic law, while Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Robert Sharpe considers
the manner in which the Court has interpreted and applied the principle of
judicial independence in recent years. The papers by Morris Rosenberg and by
David Sgayias of the federal Department of Justice consider remedial issues
that have arisen in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, while Mark Freiman, the Deputy Attorney General of Ontario, reflects on the impact that the
Charter has on the role of the Attorney General as chief legal adviser to the
Crown. Geoffrey Cowper and Lorne Sossin explore a neglected topic in Canadian constitutional law, the role of a political questions doctrine, arguing that
our own Supreme Court might benefit by having regard to the manner in which
such a doctrine has been developed in the United States. David Paciocco provides a thoughtful contribution on the impact that the newly-enacted Antiterrorism Act50 is likely to have on the interpretation and application of fundamental constitutional norms in the years ahead.

49

Earlier indications of this new attitude can be found in Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 121 and Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453.
50
S.C. 2001, c. 41.
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Table 4
Dissents51 in Constitutional Cases on the McLachlin Court
January 1, 2000-January 28, 2002
Justice

McLachlin C.J
L’Heureux-Dubé J.
Gonthier J.
Iacobucci J.
Major J.
Bastarache J.
Binnie J.
Arbour J.
LeBel J.

Dissents
(Dissents Authored)
4 dissents
(authored none)
1 dissent
(authored none)
1 dissent
(authored none)
3 dissents
(authored 1)
4 dissents
(authored 3)
2 dissents
(authored 2)
3 dissents
(authored 0)
5 dissents
(authored 2)
2 dissents
(authored 1)

Direction of Dissent
— favoured
Claim/Challenge
3

Direction of Dissent
— Opposed
Claim/Challenge
1

0

1

0

1

3

0

3

1

1

1

3

0

5

0

2

0

Looking ahead, over the next 12 months two new members will be joining
the Court, replacing recently retired Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé and Justice
Charles Gonthier (the latter scheduled to retire in mid-2003). Following the
retirement of Gonthier J. there is only one more retirement from the Supreme
Court expected over the next decade, that of Justice Major scheduled for 2006.
This suggests that the membership on the Court may well be entering a period
of relative stability that could stretch throughout the next decade.
It also suggests that the selection of these two new members of the Court in
2002-2003 could well be pivotal for the shape of the Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence. As Table 4 indicates, the retiring justices, L’Heureux-Dubé and
Gonthier JJ., have tended to be more supportive of government claims in cases
based on sections 7-14 of the Charter than have most of their colleagues.
(Moreover, in the initial two years following the appointment of Beverley

51

Dissents are cases in which at least one member of the Court would have disposed of some
part of the case differently; thus concurrences in the result are not counted as dissents. During the
relevant period, the Court was unanimous in 26/35 constitutional cases (74%). Breakdown of cases
in which there were dissents is as follows: an 8-1 split occurred in 2 cases; a 6-3 split in 1 case; a 52 split in 2 cases; and a 5-4 split in 4 cases.
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McLachlin as Chief Justice in January 2000, L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ.
dissented in just one constitutional case.) In contrast, Chief Justice McLachlin
as well as Justices Arbour, Binnie and Major have dissented more frequently in
constitutional cases over this time period, with their dissents overwhelmingly
favouring Charter claimants as opposed to government. Certain commentators
have already remarked on the fact that the Canadian Supreme Court has given a
relatively robust interpretation to the criminal rights guarantees in the Charter. 52
Depending on the attitudes of the two new Court appointees from Quebec, we
could well see a shift in the Court’s approach even more in the direction of
Charter claimants, particularly in criminal rights cases, than has been the case
in the past.

52

See, for example, Hogg’s commentary on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure in s. 8 in Constitutional Law of Canada (1997), at s.
45.4.
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